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I. INTRODUCTION

This article surveys significant developments in intellectual property (IP) law
during the past year (i.e., 2013 or the Survey Period). 1 While this article focuses
on case law that is precedential in the Fifth Circuit, it also reviews IP law
developments that are likely to be influential in the evolution of Texas IP
jurisprudence. Thus, the cases cited focus on the decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Federal Circuits. For
developments in copyright and trademark law, the Fifth Circuit’s authority is
binding, but other circuits, such as the Second and the Ninth, are considered
highly persuasive. Because all cases concerning a substantive issue of patent law
are appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, decisions
from that court during the Survey period are included in this article.
The U.S. Supreme Court was quite active in the IP field since the last Survey
period (i.e., 2012) ended, deciding five cases involving IP issues 2 and granting
writs of certiorari on nine others. 3 In patents, the Court showed particular
interest in what qualifies as patentable subject matter. 4 The Court also
considered whether patent exhaustion applies to self-replicating seeds 5 and
granted certiorari to consider divided patent infringement. 6 The Court
considered other issues including whether federal jurisdiction extends to patent
malpractice claims 7 and whether “reverse payment” settlements are immune
from antitrust attack.8 The Federal Circuit also made important developments
to its patent law jurisprudence. 9 Additionally, Congress enacted the Patent Law
1. The views expressed in this article are the views of the individual authors and are not
necessarily those of Haynes and Boone, LLP, its attorneys, or any of its clients.
2. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013); Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059,
1062 (2013); Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013); Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2110–11 (2013); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1354 (2013).
3. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 734 (2013); Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 2013),
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014); Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F.
App’x 57 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 49 (2013); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health
Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 48 (2013); Petrella v.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013);
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 695 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014); Limelight Networks,
Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 895 (2014);
Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 895
(2014); WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 576 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. ABC,
Inc. v. Aero, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014).
4. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111.
5. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1764.
6. See Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d at 1305.
7. See Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1062.
8. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).
9. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Robert Bosch,
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Treaties Implementation Act of 2012, which brings the United States in
alignment with the Hague Agreement Concerning International Registration of
Industrial Designs and the Patent Law Treaty. 10
In copyright, the U.S. Supreme Court decided whether the first sale doctrine
applies to copyrighted material that is published abroad, sold abroad, and then
imported into the United States.11 A federal district court determined whether
Google’s scanning, storage, and display of millions of books falls within the “fair
use” defense to copyright infringement. 12 In trademark, the Fifth Circuit
confirmed that the defense of laches can preclude a comprehensive injunction
against an infringer. 13 The enactment of the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
which clarifies and changes trade secret law in Texas, is perhaps more
significant.14
II. PATENT UPDATE
A. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT ON PATENTS
1. A Closer Look at Reverse Payment Agreements—Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis,
Inc.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered
whether the monopoly rights associated with a patent should shield a reverse
payment agreement from antitrust attack. 15 A reverse payment, or pay-for-delay
settlement agreement, is an agreement that involves a patentee paying the
alleged patent infringer. 16 This is unusual because the majority of settlements
involve the alleged infringer paying the patentee. 17 These agreements are
common among pharmaceutical companies and are often characterized as
agreements that keep less-expensive generic drugs off the shelves. 18 In a highly
anticipated decision that raised uncertainty in the pharmaceutical industry, the
Court held that reverse payment settlements are not immune from antitrust
attack and should be evaluated using the rule of reason test that is ordinarily
applied to antitrust cases.19
Solvay Pharmaceuticals owns a patent covering AndroGel®, which was the
LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Raylon LLC v. Complus Data
Innovations, Inc., 700 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
10. See Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012, § 201, Pub. L. 112-211, 126 Stat.
1531.
11. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355 (2013).
12. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
13. Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 626 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
88 (2013).
14. See Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 134A.001
et seq. (2013).
15. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227, 2237 (2013).
16. Id. at 2227.
17. See id. at 2231.
18. Id. at 2227; Edward Wyatt, Supreme Court Lets Regulators Sue Over Generic Drug Deals, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/business/supreme-court-says-drugmakers-can-be-sued-over-pay-for-delay-deals.html?_r=o.
19. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2227, 2237.
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first branded drug to receive FDA approval for gel-based testosterone
replacement therapy. 20 Using an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA)
under the Hatch-Waxman Act, Actavis, Inc. (then known as Watson
Pharmaceuticals) requested FDA approval of a generic version of AndroGel®.21
Actavis also certified in its application that Solvay’s patent covering AndroGel®
was invalid. 22 Solvay then sued Actavis for patent infringement, and Actavis
responded with a patent invalidity claim. 23 Later, Actavis and Solvay settled and
entered into multiple settlement agreements. Solvay agreed to dismiss the
infringement action, and Actavis agreed to not market its generic product for
nine years. 24 Actavis also agreed to market AndroGel® in exchange for a portion
of the gel’s profits.25 Based on these agreements, Actavis expected to receive
between $15 and $30 million per year from Solvay. 26
The FTC filed suit, claiming the settlement agreements violated antitrust laws
because Solvay was paying Actavis to not compete with AndroGel®. 27 The
federal district court applied the “scope-of-the-patent” approach, which includes
examining “(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the
extent to which the agreements exceeded that scope; and (3) the resulting
anticompetitive effects.” 28 Because the FTC did not allege that the settlement
agreements exceeded the scope of Solvay’s patent, the district court dismissed
the FTC’s complaint.29
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the evaluation of reverse payment
agreements for antitrust violations would be difficult administratively. 30
Antitrust claims often hinge on the validity of a patent, which would create a
patent validity case-within-a-case for each antitrust claim. 31 The Eleventh Circuit
also noted that, as a matter of public policy, settlement agreements are generally
favored. 32
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the FTC argued that reverse payment
agreements are presumptively unlawful. 33 Therefore, the agreement should be
evaluated using the “quick look” approach, in which the defendant bears the
burden of showing that the agreement provides some countervailing
procompetitive effects. 34 Actavis argued that a reverse payment agreement
should be evaluated using the “scope-of-the-patent” approach, in which the
20. Id. at 2229.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. In re Androgel Antitrust Lit. (No. II), 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1374–75 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
24. Id. at 1375.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1375–76.
28. Id. at 1377.
29. Id. at 1379.
30. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1313–15 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d and remanded
sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
31. Id.
32. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2230.
33. Brief for Petitioner at 33, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12416).
34. Id.
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agreement must exceed the exclusionary potential of a patent. 35 Actavis also
noted that a ruling severely limiting settlement options would chill settlements
and could result in less innovation from drug manufacturers.36
The Supreme Court rejected both proposed approaches and noted that
anticompetitive effects must be measured against patent law policy as well as
antitrust policies.37 It held that a reverse agreement should be evaluated under
the “rule of reason” test that is ordinarily applied in antitrust cases. 38
Five considerations were given in support of adopting the “rule of reason”
approach. 39 First, reverse settlement agreements potentially create a “genuine
adverse effects on competition.” 40 It is possible that the patentee pays the patent
challenger to abandon its very strong patent invalidity claim so that both
patentee and patent challenger share the monopoly profits. 41 In this situation,
the consumer loses. 42 Second, the “rule of reason” test allows an antitrust
defendant to justify any anticompetitive consequences that may result from a
reverse settlement agreement. 43 Legitimate justifications may be that the
payment amount is roughly equivalent to litigation costs, exchanged for services,
or related to other traditional settlement considerations. 44 Third, when
unjustified anticompetitive harm is possible, the patentee likely possesses the
market power and financing to bring about the harm. 45 Fourth, evaluating a
reverse settlement agreement for antitrust violations should be less difficult than
the Eleventh Circuit describes. 46 That is, it would not be normally “necessary to
litigate the patent validity [in order] to answer the antitrust question.” 47 Instead,
the Court suggests that a “large” payment would, in itself, suggest that the
patentee seriously doubts the patent’s validity. 48 Fifth, lawsuits will still be settled
even if large, unjustified reverse payment settlements are now susceptible to
antitrust attack. 49 The Court notes that instead of large payments, the parties
could negotiate for the generic brand to enter the market prior to the patent’s
expiration. 50
The often described “amorphous” rule of reason approach involves
determining “whether the restraint imposed . . . merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it . . . may suppress or even destroy

35.
12-416).
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Brief for Respondent at 13–21, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No.
Id. at 44–45.
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231.
Id. at 2227.
Id. at 2234–37.
Id. at 2234 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2234–35.
Id. at 2235.
Id. at 2235–36.
Id. at 2236.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2237.
Id.
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competition.” 51 Generally, a court should consider “the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; and the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable.” 52 It was left to the lower courts to tailor the rule of reason analysis for
reverse payment settlement agreements, but the Court does state that factors to
be considered are “likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market
power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations present in the
circumstances.” 53 Additionally, the likelihood of anticompetitive effects will
depend upon the size of the reverse payment, payment size compared to future
litigation costs, its independence from “other services for which it might
represent payment,” and the absence of any other convincing justification. 54
Three justices dissented, noting that the “scope-of-the-patent” test properly
separates patent and antitrust law, with exceptions involving sham litigation and
fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office. 55 The dissent noted that the “rule of
reason” test could require the lower courts to determine the validity of the
patent, which would involve costly and lengthy litigation. 56 Additionally, the
dissent argued that the majority’s holding discourages settlement of patent
litigation and fails to recognize that patent law also protects consumer interest
by providing protection against competition. 57
How the Court’s decision will affect the pharmaceutical industry’s use of
reverse payment agreements is currently unknown. However, Actavis concedes
that the Court’s holding will result in an “additional and unnecessary
administrative burden” on the pharmaceutical industry.58 With little guidance
on how the rule of reason test will be implemented, the pharmaceutical industry
will be watching closely for case law developments.
2. The Proper Home for a Case-Within-a-Case—Gunn v. Minton
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), federal courts have exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction over cases “arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents.” 59
In Gunn v. Minton, the Supreme Court considered whether a state malpractice
claim involving the handling of a patent case fell within the subject matter
jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). 60 Vernon Minton developed a computer
program known as the Texas Computer Exchange Network (TEXCEN), which
he leased to a securities brokerage. 61 Over a year later, Minton filed a patent

51. FTC v. Ind. Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (quoting Bd. of Trade of City of
Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
52. Bd. of Trade of City of Chic., 246 U.S. at 238.
53. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231.
54. Id. at 2237.
55. Id. at 2239.
56. Id. at 2245.
57. Id. at 2245–46.
58. Press Release, Actavis, U.S. Supreme Court Reverses U.S. Court of Appeals Decision in
FTC. v. Actavis (June 17, 2013), available at http://ir.actavis.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=65778&p=irolnewsArticle_pf&ID=1830404.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
60. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1062, 1065 (2013).
61. Id.
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application that was substantially based on TEXCEN. 62 Upon receiving a patent,
Minton—represented by Jerry Gunn—filed a patent infringement suit against the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the NASDAQ Stock
Market, Inc. (NASDAQ). 63 Gunn was not aware of the lease of TEXCEN at that
time. 64 At trial, NASDAQ moved for summary judgment and argued that the
lease of TEXCEN violated the “on sale” bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), and
therefore, Minton’s patent was invalid. 65 Minton tried to distinguish between
the patented system and TEXCEN, but the district court granted the summary
judgment motion and held that the patent was invalid. 66 Afterward, Minton
obtained new counsel and filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the
lease fell within the “experimental use” exception to the on-sale bar. 67 The
motion was denied, with the district court holding that the experimental use
argument was waived. 68 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision. 69
Minton, believing that this waiver resulted in the invalidation of his patent
and the loss of his $100 million damages claim against NASDAQ, filed a
malpractice claim against Gunn in Texas state court. 70 Liability under the
malpractice claim hinged on the causation element and whether the lease was,
in fact, for an experimental purpose. 71 The Texas trial court found that Minton
could provide no evidence supporting the experimental purpose argument and
granted summary judgment to Gunn. 72 Minton then filed an appeal and argued
that his malpractice claim actually belonged in federal court because it “arose
under exclusive federal patent law jurisdiction.” 73 The Texas Court of Appeals
applied the Grable test, which provides that federal jurisdiction is triggered over
a state law claim if a federal issue is “(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed,
(3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting
the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” 74 A divided panel of the Texas
Court of Appeals held that while Minton’s claim involved a federal issue that
was necessarily raised and actually disputed, it was not substantial enough to
meet the Grable test. 75 Additionally, if federal courts possessed exclusive subjectmatter jurisdiction over state-based legal malpractice claims requiring application
of federal patent law, the federal-state balance would be disrupted. 76 The Texas
Court of Appeals then affirmed the trial court’s decision. 77 On appeal, the
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 637 (Tex. 2011) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1062.
Id.
Id. at 1062–63; Minton, 355 S.W.3d at 638.
Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1063.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 639 (Tex. 2013), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1063, 1065.
Id.
Id. at 1063.
Id.
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Supreme Court of Texas reversed, noting that the determination of the
experimental use exception was the crux of the state claim and federal courts are
“well-versed in that subject matter.” 78
After applying the Grable test, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the claim
should stay in state court.79 While the resolution of a federal patent question
was “necessary” to Minton’s case and was “actually disputed,” it was not
“substantial.” 80 The Court explained that for an issue to be “substantial,” it must
be important to the federal system as a whole. 81 Here, the backward-looking
nature of a malpractice claim prevented a change to the status of Minton’s
patent. 82 His patent would have remained invalid even if the state court would
have found that the experimental use argument could have succeeded. 83 The
Court also dismissed the concern that a state court determining a patent
malpractice claim would undermine the development of a uniform body of law,
because a federal court is not bound by a state court’s decision regarding a
hypothetical case-within-a-case malpractice claim. 84 Additionally, the federal
courts’ greater familiarity with patent law is not such a significant factor to
trigger federal jurisdiction. 85 Without a substantial federal issue, the Court held
that removing the claim from state court would also disrupt the balance of
federal and state judicial responsibilities. 86
3. Blaming the Bean—Monsanto v. Bowman
The sole question before the Court in Monsanto Co. v. Bowman was whether
to apply the doctrine of patent exhaustion to self-replicating technologies, such
as seeds. 87 Under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, an authorized sale of a
patented item terminates all patent rights in that item and allows the purchaser
to use or resell that item.88
Monsanto owned patents covering Roundup® Ready soybeans, which
Monsanto or its licensees sold to growers under a limited use license. 89 The
limited use license allowed each grower to sell the second-generation seeds, or
progeny seeds, to local grain elevators to be used as feed or as a commodity
grain. 90 Saving the progeny seeds or selling them elsewhere violated the limited
use license. 91 Vernon Bowman, a grower, purchased commodity soybean seeds
from a local grain elevator. 92 Bowman hoped that some of these commodity

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See Minton, 355 S.W.3d at 646–47; Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1063–64.
See Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065–68.
See id. at 1066.
See id.
Id. at 1066–67.
See id. at 1067.
See id.
See id. at 1068.
See id.
See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013).
See id. at 1766.
Id. at 1764.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1765.
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seeds were second-generation patented soybean seeds, which would allow him to
obtain patented soybean seeds at a much lower price than buying them from
Monsanto. 93 Bowman planted the commodity seeds and grew soybeans, with
some being third-generation patented soybean seeds. 94 Bowman harvested and
saved the third-generation patented soybean seeds for future plantings. 95
Monsanto sued for patent infringement, and Bowman raised the patent
exhaustion defense, arguing that the local grain elevators were sold the soybeans
without restrictions. 96 Therefore, any patent rights to the soybeans and their
progenies were exhausted. 97 The district court held that patent exhaustion did
not apply because the third-generation seeds were newly infringing articles and
were never sold. 98 Therefore, patent exhaustion could not apply to the thirdgeneration seeds. Additionally, it held there was never an unconditional sale to
trigger patent exhaustion because the second-generation seeds were never
authorized to be sold for replanting. 99
The Federal Circuit agreed with Monsanto and found that patent exhaustion
did not bar Monsanto’s infringement claims. 100 The court held that even if
Monsanto’s patent rights in the second-generation seeds were exhausted by the
authorized sale to grain elevators, an authorized sale conveys only the right to
use the article, not the right to make a newly infringing article (i.e., the thirdgeneration seeds). 101 Additionally, it held the third-generation seeds were newly
infringing articles and did not “substantially embody” the second-generation
seeds. 102 The court noted that to hold otherwise would eviscerate the rights of
one who owns patents in self-replicating technologies. 103
On appeal, Bowman acknowledged that the exhaustion doctrine does not
allow a purchaser to make a new product. 104 However, Bowman argued that his
activities fell within “use” of the seeds, since he only planted the seeds as any
normal farmer would do. 105 It was the seeds that replicated to make the new
product. 106 The Supreme Court rejected this “blame the bean” defense and
noted that Bowman was not a passive observer of the seeds’ multiplication. 107
Rather, Bowman was an active participant in the beans’ reproduction. 108 The
Court agreed with the Federal Circuit and held that patent exhaustion does not
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 839 (S.D. Ind. 2009).
99. See id.
100. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
101. See id. at 1347 (citing Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1241, 1298–99 (Fed. Cir.
2002); id. at 1348 (citing Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
102. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 1346.
103. See id. (citing Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
104. See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1768 (2013).
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 1768–69.
108. See id. at 1769.
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allow Bowman to reproduce the patented soybeans. 109 The Court noted that to
hold otherwise would provide little benefit to Monsanto’s patent and would
deprive Monsanto of its monopoly. 110 The Court limited the holding to selfreplicating seeds and acknowledged that self-replicating products are becoming
more prevalent, complex, and diverse. 111 Determining whether patent
exhaustion applies to self-replicating products that reproduce outside of the
purchaser’s control or that might be an “incidental step in using the item for
another purpose” was left for another day. 112
4. Differentiating Between Genes—Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc.
With its issue often summarized as whether a corporation can own someone’s
genes, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 113 received
widespread media attention. 114 The real issue was, in fact, more tedious than the
media described. The Court considered whether isolated human genes and
synthetic genes are patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 115
The patents at issue related to isolated and synthetic human genes (and
associated mutations) that were connected with a predisposition to breast and
ovarian cancers (BRCA genes). 116 Myriad was the exclusive licensee of patents
relating to isolating the BRCA genes and to synthetically creating DNA found
within the BRCA genes. 117 The declaratory action filed sought a declaration that
claims relating to the BRCA genes were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 118 The
district court held that claims relating to isolated human genes and synthetic
genes were invalid because they covered products of nature. 119 The Federal
Circuit reversed, holding that both were patent eligible under § 101. 120
On appeal, the Court considered Diamond v. Chakrabarty 121in its analysis,
stating that the “Chakrabarty bacterium was new ‘with markedly different
characteristics from any found in nature.’” 122 The Court distinguished
Chakrabarty with the facts of this case, stating that Myriad did not create
anything with its discovery of the isolated BRCA genes. 123 The Court noted that
while isolating the gene was very important and useful, isolated genes are not
patent eligible under § 101. 124 It did hold, however, that synthetic genes do
109. See id.
110. See id. at 1765.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
114. Steven Salzberg, Myriad Genetics CEO Claims He Owns Your Genes, FORBES, Apr. 13, 2013,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevensalzberg/2013/04/13/myriad-genetics-ceo-owns-your-genes/.
115. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2111.
116. See id. at 2112.
117. See id. at 2113.
118. Id. at 2114.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
122. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2117.
123. See id.
124. See id.
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meet the demands of § 101 because they are not a “product of nature.” Instead,
synthetic genes are created by a lab technician. 125
After its unanimous holding, the Court noted what was not implicated by its
decision. 126 First, the Court explained that its opinion did not include method
claims. 127 Myriad “could possibly have sought a method patent” if it had
discovered a different method of influencing genes in its search for the BRCA
genes. 128 Second, Myriad was able to seek patent protection “on new
applications of knowledge” related to the BRCA genes. 129 Finally, no opinion
was provided regarding whether alteration of the genetic code satisfies the
burdens of § 101. 130
This decision is considered something of a compromise. While the
Association for Molecular Pathology characterizes the ruling as one that will “lay
the foundation for continued research and application of diagnosis and
treatment of diseases at the molecular level,” Myriad considers it as underscoring
the patent eligibility of its method claims and ensuring its strong intellectual
property protection. 131
B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ON PATENTS
1. Is That Your Final Answer?—Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp.
In Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp., the Federal Circuit, en banc,
decided whether 28 U.S.C. § 1295(c) grants jurisdiction to entertain appeals
from patent infringement liability determinations when the issue of willfulness
has not been decided and when a trial on damages has not yet occurred. 132
Section 1295(a), which is known as the final judgment rule, gives jurisdiction to
the Federal Circuit over “any appeal from a final decision of a district court of
the United States.” 133 However, not all decisions must be final. Section 1295(c)
carves out an exception and allows the Federal Circuit to hear an appeal made
from a judgment that is “final except for an accounting.” 134 The decision in Robert
Bosch hinged on whether, under section 1292(c)(2), the meaning of “accounting”
includes a trial on damages and a determination of willfulness. 135
Robert Bosch and Pylon Manufacturing were involved in patent infringement
litigation when Pylon, during the pretrial period, requested that the district

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See id. at 2119.
See id. at 2119–20.
See id. at 2119.
See id. at 2119–20.
See id. at 2120.
See id.
See Press Release, AMP Celebrates SCOTUS Decision on AMP v. Myriad Case,
ASSOCIATION
FOR
MOLECULAR
PATHOLOGY
(June
13,
2013),
http://www.amp.org/about/press_releases/; Press Release, Supreme Court Upholds Myriad’s
cDna
Patent
Claims,
MYRIAD
(June
13,
2013),
http://investor.myriad.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=771232.
132. Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
133. See id.
134. Id. at 1308 (emphasis added).
135. See id. at 1309.
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court bifurcate the liability and damages issues. 136 The district court granted the
motion and stayed discovery on damages, including willfulness. 137 After the
court found infringement, Pylon appealed the judgments on infringement and
patent validity. 138 Bosch moved to dismiss Pylon’s appeals and argued that
because damages and willfulness had not been determined, the Federal Circuit
lacked jurisdiction. 139
The Federal Circuit first considered whether “an accounting” includes a
damages determination. 140 The court reviewed the historical common-law and
statutory interpretation of an “accounting” and found that while an accounting
was historically available in equity, a trial on damages was not precluded from
the “accounting” described in section 1292(c). 141 In a seven-to-two split, the
court provided four points in support of its holding. 142 First, section 1292 was
revised in 1948 to expand the court’s “jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals
from cases in equity to ‘civil actions for patent infringement which are final
except for accounting.’” 143 Second, a damages trial now decides the issues that
were once decided in accountings. 144 Third, the reason for implementing the
section 1292(c) exception—the high cost of an accounting—applies to today’s
modern damages trial, which is “notoriously complex and expensive.” 145 Finally,
the court has heard appeals in similar situations since 1984. 146
Next the court considered whether an accounting included the determination
of willfulness. 147 With a five-to-four split, the court determined that an
accounting included the determination of willfulness when Congress enacted
section 1292. 148 Since then, multiple appellate courts have found that
willfulness is decided in an “accounting.” 149 Therefore, the Federal Circuit has
jurisdiction over appeals from patent infringement liability when willfulness
issues remain undecided. 150
Appealing an infringement and validity judgment while avoiding a damages
trial and a determination of willfulness is expected to reduce the cost of
litigation, at least in the first trial. An alleged infringer may now receive
appellate review regarding a finding of infringement before incurring the
expenses relating to a damages trial.
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2. One More Way to Avoid Induced Infringement Liability—Commil USA, LLC v.
Cisco Systems, Inc.
In Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the Federal Circuit considered
whether “evidence of a good-faith belief of [patent invalidity] may negate the
requisite intent for induced infringement.” 151 Commil sued Cisco for patent
infringement relating to protocols in wireless communication systems.152 Cisco
was found liable for direct infringement, and Commil was awarded $3.7 million
in damages. 153 Cisco was also found liable for induced infringement, and
Commil was awarded $63.7 million in damages. 154 Cisco appealed, arguing that
the district court should have allowed Cisco to present evidence supporting its
good-faith belief of invalidity to support its lack of requisite intent required for
induced infringement. 155 The Federal Circuit agreed with Cisco that a patent
infringer should be able to present evidence relevant to a good-faith belief of
invalidity. 156 The court noted that “it is axiomatic that one cannot infringe an
invalid patent.” 157 Although, a good-faith belief does not preclude a finding of
induced infringement, it should be considered when determining an infringer’s
requisite intent. 158
That a good-faith belief of non-infringement can be used to rebut the
required intent of induced infringement was already established. 159 The court’s
opinion in Commil establishes another avenue for escaping liability under
induced infringement—a good-faith belief of invalidity. 160
3. Rule 11 Sanctions Are Not a Myth—Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovation, Inc.
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovation, Inc.
is considered good news for defendants facing unreasonable patent infringement
claims. 161 Some hope that this decision, as well as the Supreme Court’s
upcoming decisions regarding the recovery of attorney’s fees, will curb abusive
patent litigation. 162 Raylon addressed whether a patentee’s conduct should be
reviewed using a subjective or objective standard when determining Rule 11
violation issues.163 The Federal Circuit held that an attorney, under Fifth
Circuit law, is measured by an objective standard of reasonableness. 164
151. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
152. Id. at 1364.
153. Id. at 1365.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1367.
157. Id. at 1368.
158. Id. at 1369.
159. See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
160. Commil USA, LLC, 720 F.3d at 1364.
161. Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovations, Inc., 700 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Civ. 2012), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 94 (2013).
162. See Octane Fitness, LLC, v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 49 (2013); Highmark
Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 48 (2013); Randall R. Rader, Make Patent Trolls
Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/makepatent-trolls-pay-in-court.html?_r=0.
163. Raylon, LLC, 700 F.3d at 1367.
164. Id.
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Additionally, the court concluded that a patentee’s litigation motives have “no
place in the Rule 11 analysis.” 165
Raylon sued Complus for direct patent infringement and argued that the
claim element relating to a “display pivotally mounted on said housing” should
be interpreted as a “display that is mounted on the housing and can be pivoted
relative to the viewer’s or user’s angle of visual orientation.” 166 In essence, any
fixed-mounted screen held by a user would meet Raylon’s proposed claim
element because the user could pivot the device by bending her elbow or
wrist. 167 Complus notified Raylon multiple times regarding Raylon’s possible
violation of Rule 11. 168 Regardless, Raylon maintained its position. 169 Complus
eventually filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions.170 At a consolidated hearing, the
district court rejected Raylon’s interpretation of the pivotally mounted display
and granted summary judgment in Complus’s favor, but denied the motion for
Rule 11 sanctions against Raylon. 171 In evaluating the Rule 11 motion, the
district court looked to (1) whether it was clear that the case lacked any credible
infringement theory and (2) whether it had been brought only to coerce a
nuisance value settlement. 172 The district court focused on Raylon’s past
settlements and its damages model in determining whether Raylon was
attempting to recover a nuisance value settlement or had a “good faith
nature.” 173 The district court held that it was “not a situation where ‘the cost of
the litigation is more of a driving force than the merits of the patent-in-suit’” and
denied the motion without evaluating whether there was a credible infringement
theory. 174 Complus appealed, arguing that in the Fifth Circuit, an objective
standard, not a subjective standard, is used to determine whether Raylon’s
conduct was reasonable.175
The Federal Circuit agreed with Complus that Raylon’s motivation was not
relevant in determining Rule 11 sanctions. 176 The Federal Circuit then applied
the objective reasonable standard and found that Raylon’s claim construction
was frivolous. 177 The court noted that there “is a threshold below which a claim
construction is ‘so unreasonable that no reasonable litigant could believe it
would succeed.’” 178 Here, neither the intrinsic evidence nor the prosecution
history supported Raylon’s claim construction argument.179 Instead, every claim
required a “display being pivotally mounted on said housing.” 180 In essence,
165.
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Raylon was proposing a claim construction outside any standard canons of claim
construction and one that “no objectively reasonable litigant . . . would believe
its claim construction could succeed.” 181 The Federal Circuit remanded the case
for the district court to determine an appropriate sanction. 182
C. THE PATENT LAW TREATIES IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 2012
On December 18, 2012, Congress enacted the Patent Law Treaties
Implementation Act of 2012 (PLTIA) to harmonize United States law with the
Hague Agreement Concerning International Registration of Industrial Designs
Hague Agreement and the Patent Law Treaty. 183 The U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) has implemented changes due to the Patent Law
Treaty separately from changes due to the Hague Agreement.
The Patent Law Treaty streamlines filing and processing procedures for patent
applications filed as international applications under the Patent Cooperation
Treaty. 184 It does not apply, however, to provisional, reissue, design, or plant
applications. 185 For example, a filing date will be given to some applications that
lack a claim, drawing, or specification if an applicant files the application “by
reference.” 186 The Patent Law Treaty also makes it easier for an applicant to
extend his or her right of priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a). 187 The applicant
must only show an “unintentional” delay in complying with time periods or
formality requirements. 188 Previously, the delay must have been
“unavoidable.” 189 These changes took effect on December 18, 2013. 190 The
USPTO encourages applicants to consider most of the changes as providing
additional safeguards during the patent prosecution process. 191
The Hague Agreement facilitates protection of design patents by allowing an
applicant to file “a single, standardized [international design] application in a
single language” for protection in the countries that are members of the Hague
Agreement. 192 The process is often considered analogous to the Madrid Protocol
process for trademarks. 193 Specifically, the PLTIA loosens the restrictions
181. Id. at 1369.
182. Id. at 1370.
183. See Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012, 201, Pub. L. 112-211, 126 Stat.
1531.
184. Id.
185. Changes to Implement the Patent Law Treaty, 78 Fed. Reg. 21788, 21789 (Apr. 11, 2013).
186. Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012 § 201, 126 Stat. 1531 (to be codified at
35 U.S.C. § 111); Changes to Implement the Patent Law Treaty, 78 Fed. Reg. 21788, 21795,
21797, 217805, 217807 (Apr. 11, 2013).
187. 35 U.S.C. § 133; Changes to Implement the Patent Law Treaty, 78 Fed. Reg. at 21788,
21791 (Apr. 11, 2013).
188. Changes to Implement the Patent Law Treaty, 78 Fed. Reg. at 21788.
189. 35 U.S.C. § 133; Changes to Implement the Patent Law Treaty, 78 Fed. Reg. at 21788,
21791.
190. See Changes to Implement the Patent Law Treaty, 78 Fed. Reg. at 21792.
191. Changes to Implement the Patent Law Treaty, Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 62368, 62368.
192. Changes to Implement the Hague Agreement Concerning International Registration of
Industrial Designs; Proposed Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 71879, 71880.
193. Carl Schwartz, What US Design Patent Applicants Can Expect from Hague, LAW 360 (June 3,
2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/441180/what-us-design-patent-applicants-can-expect-fromhague.
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regarding who can file an international design application with the USPTO and
clarifies the applicant’s right of priority claims. 194 The Hague Agreement also
provides other advantages, such as longer patent terms.195 The design patent
term is increased a year from fourteen to fifteen years from the date of grant. 196
Additionally, provisional rights in a design patent may be available. In the
United States, provisional rights may begin at the date of publication of a patent
application. 197 The International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (IB) will publish an international design application.198
Considering 35 U.S.C. § 154 was amended to include the publication by the IB
as falling with the definition of “publication” in regards to provisional rights, it
follows that a published, international application designating the United States
triggers provisional rights.199 The USPTO has not yet published final rules
outlining how these changes will be implemented. 200 However, these changes
should result in a more cost effective and efficient method for obtaining design
patent protection in numerous countries.
III. COPYRIGHT UPDATE
A. ALLOWING ARBITRAGE—JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. V. KIRTSAENG
Under the first sale doctrine, the lawful owner of a copyrighted work may
resell or otherwise dispose of that work without the permission of the copyright
owner.201 However, section 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act prohibits importing
copyrighted works without the permission of the owner. 202 In Kirtsaeng v. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., the Supreme Court determined whether the first sale doctrine
applies to goods manufactured and sold abroad, but then imported into the
United States.203
Defendant Supap Kirtsaeng’s family and friends in Thailand shipped him
foreign edition textbooks that were printed abroad by a John Wiley & Sons
subsidiary. 204 Kirtsaeng then sold these textbooks for a profit, reimbursed his
family and friends for their expenses, and kept the remainder for himself.205
194. Changes to Implement the Hague Agreement concerning International Registration of
Industrial Designs; Proposed Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 71880.
195. Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012 at § 102, 126 Stat. 1532 (to be codified
at 35 U.S.C. § 173).
196. Id.
197. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d).
198. Hague Agreement Concerning the International Deposit of Industrial Designs Art. 10,
July 2, 1999, 2279 U.N.T.S. 156.
199. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d).
200. Vera Suarez & Alan Herda, The Patent Law Treaties Implentation Act of 2012,
HAYNESBOONE
(Mar.
1,
2013),
http://www.haynesboone.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Newsletters/Patent%20Law%20Treatie
s%20Implementation%20Act%20-%20Suarez%20and%20Herda.pdf.
201. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
202. See 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1).
203. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355 (2013).
204. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 213 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d and
remanded, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
205. Id.
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John Wiley & Sons filed suit against Kirtsaeng for copyright infringement,
claiming that Kirtsaeng violated section 602(a)(1) by importing the copyrighted
foreign edition textbooks.206 Kirtsaeng tried to raise a defense based on the first
sale doctrine, but the district court found this defense inapplicable to copies
published outside of the United States. 207
In determining whether the first sale doctrine applies to copies manufactured
abroad, the Second Circuit first looked to the text of section 109(a). 208 Section
109(a) embodies the first sale doctrine and applies to copies “lawfully made
under [Title 17].” 209 After extensive analysis, the court found this text too
ambiguous to decide the issue alone. 210 Confronted with an ambiguous statute,
the court adopted an interpretation it found would best comport with section
602(a)(1). 211 The court reasoned that if the first sale doctrine applied to copies
manufactured and acquired abroad, section 602(a)(1) would lose much of its
force because copyright holders would no longer be able to control importation
of their works in the vast majority of cases.212 The court therefore held that the
“first sale doctrine [applied] . . . to copies manufactured domestically.” 213
The Supreme Court also looked to the language of section 109(a) to
determine whether “lawfully made under [Title 17]” imposes a geographical
limitation. 214 It found that reading in a geographical limitation resulted in more
linguistic problems than it solved. 215 Instead, the Court noted that a
nongeographical interpretation combats piracy and gives each word distinct
purpose. 216 The opinion noted that the common-law history of the “first sale”
doctrine lacked any mention of geography and that a contemporary statutory
interpretation supported Kirtsaeng’s argument. 217 Moreover, reading a
geographical limitation into the first sale doctrine could disturb current practices
within libraries, used-book dealers, technology companies, consumer-goods
retailers, and museums. 218 The Court found that while the nongeographical
reading whittles away the protections afforded in section 602(a)(1), nothing in
the statute guarantees a copyright owner the ability to divide foreign and
domestic markets. 219
Justices Kagan and Alito wrote separately to note that while omitting
geographical limitations from section 109(a) is the correct interpretation, the
Court’s prior holdings substantially narrow the scope of section 602(a)(1) to “a
fairly esoteric set of applications.” 220 Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Scalia
206.
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dissented and argued that a nongeographical interpretation results in an
“international exhaustion” of copyrights, which the United States has firmly
resisted on the world stage. 221
Large publishers that rely on arbitrage to maximize profits in each
geographical market are greatly disappointed with this decision. 222 The decision
greatly diminished the ability to carve out territorial rights for copyrighted
material. 223 In response, copyright owners could increase prices outside of the
United States to reduce or eliminate any profit from grey market sellers. 224
Additionally, this decision could incentivize digital textbook use, as the digital
textbooks are generally leased to a user, which would not trigger the first sale
doctrine. 225 Lastly, section 109(a) could be amended to include a geographical
limitation. 226
B. FAIR USE—THE AUTHORS GUILD, INC. V. GOOGLE INC.
In another significant copyright case, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York determined in The Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc. that
Google’s scanning, storage, and digital display of more than twenty million
books was protected by the fair use defense under section 107 of the Copyright
Act.227 The success of a fair use defense is dependent upon the following four
factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the substantiality and amount of the portion used in
comparison to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) how the use effects the
potential market or the value of the copyrighted work. 228
In Author’s Guild, the court found that Google’s use was highly
transformative; therefore, the first factor strongly favored a finding of fair use. 229
Specifically, scanning the books transforms them into a “comprehensive word
index” that allows users to find books. 230 By showing only a small portion of a
book, or a snippet, a user is prevented from accessing the entire book. The use
of snippets also allows for the checking of citations and selection of a book. 231
Additionally, substantive research relating to word usage and linguistics within a
wide variety of books is now possible.232 While Google is a for-profit entity, it
does not sell the digital copies of the books (or the snippets) and does not
display ads on the pages that contain snippets. 233 The second factor also weighed
221. Id. at 1373.
222. Andrew Albanese, What Does Kirtsaeng v. Wiley Mean for the Industry?, PUBLISHERS
WEEKLY,
(Mar.
23,
2013),
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industrynews/publisher-news/article/56491-a-textbook-case.html.
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227. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
228. Id. at 290.
229. Id. at 291–92.
230. Id. at 291.
231. Id.
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in Google’s favor, as the majority of the works are non-fiction and are available
to the public. 234 The third factor weighed slightly against fair use because Google
scans the entire book. 235 However, Google limits the amount of the book shown
and even blacklists approximately 10% of a book from a user’s view. 236 Finally,
the fourth factor weighs strongly in Google’s favor because users can discover
and then buy the copyrighted work, which increases the potential market for the
copyrighted work. 237 The court compared Google’s work with an in-store book
display, which allows patrons and librarians to identify books that they wish to
purchase.238 In conclusion, the court noted that the digitization of these millions
of books is beneficial because it preserves out-of-print books, identifies relevant
books for librarians and consumers, provides a full-text search database,
increases the accessibility of books for print-disabled and underserved
populations, generates new audiences, and increases income for authors and
publishers. Therefore, Google’s actions were found to constitute fair use.239
IV. TRADEMARK UPDATE
A. FRATERNITIES GET PADDLED BY LACHES—ABRAHAM V. ALPHA CHI OMEGA
In Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, the Fifth Circuit considered whether a
defense of laches can preclude a comprehensive permanent injunction when the
trademark owner’s delay resulted in prejudice to the infringer. 240 Abraham
created Paddle Tramps in 1961 to manufacture wooden paddles and other
Greek paraphernalia for fraternity and sorority members.241 Since its inception,
Paddle Tramps has used the names of different fraternities and sororities in its
products and its advertisements. 242 Prior to receiving any requests for licensing,
Abraham invested heavily in his business. 243 He had to rebuild the Paddle
Tramps business completely due to two fires and a tornado. 244 In 1990, twentynine years after it was created, fraternity and sorority organizations contacted
Abraham for the first time regarding licensing. 245 Abraham received multiple
letters asking him to become a member of a licensing program. 246 Abraham at
times either ignored these letters or responded with a refusal to enter into an
agreement. 247 Finally in 2007, forty-six years after its creation, thirty-two
fraternity and sorority organizations (Greek Organizations) sued Abraham for
234. Id. at 292.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 287, 292.
237. Id. at 293.
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240. Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 625 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
88 (2013).
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patent infringement and unfair competition in the Southern District of
Florida. 248 The Florida district court dismissed the suit and Abraham then filed
a declaratory judgment for non-infringement against the Greek Organizations in
April 2008. 249 The Greek Organizations asserted counterclaims for, inter alia,
trademark infringement. 250
The court granted summary judgment motions regarding Abraham’s
trademark infringement claims, but the issue of Abraham’s affirmatives defenses
of laches and acquiescence was put to a jury. 251 The jury found that Abraham
proved his laches defense, proved his acquiescence defense, and that the Greek
Organizations did not prove their unclean hands counter-defense. 252 The district
court then issued an injunction that allowed Abraham to continue selling an
infringing project. The court applied the “degree of prejudice of the infringer
test” and found that Abraham would be substantially prejudiced if he were
prevented from selling double raised crest backings. 253 The court noted that the
sale of the double raised crest backings “drove his sales of other non-infringing
products.” 254 Using this test, the focus is on “the degree of prejudice the
defendant would suffer in the event the infringing use is enjoined.” 255
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit observed that the “degree of prejudice of the
infringer test” was the correct test.256 The court held that tailoring an injunction
to allow Abraham to sell the double raised crest backings, while enjoining him
from selling products that represent only a small portion of his sales, was
appropriate. 257
V. TEXAS LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
A. TEXAS UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
Even though the state of Texas is one of the top five forums in which trade
secrets misappropriation is litigated, it just recently joined the majority of states
in implementing a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 258 The Texas
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA) took effect on September 1, 2013, and will
apply to trade secret misappropriation that occurs on or after this date.259 Prior
to the enactment of TUTSA, a trade secret owner looked to Texas common law,
the Restatement of Torts, the Restatement of Unfair Competition, and the
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Texas Theft Liability Act for his available legal remedies. 260 With the enactment
of TUTSA, the Texas common law is codified to provide one statutory source
that details trade secret remedies. Additionally, statute clarifies the definition of
a trade secret is clarified while providing the award of attorney’s fees and
broadening injunctive relief. 261
Previously, courts considered the following six factors to determine if
information qualifies as a trade secret:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the trade
secret owner’s business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees
and other involved in the trade secret owner’s business; (3) the extent of
the measures taken by the trade secret owner to guard the secrecy of the
information; (4) the value of the information to the trade secret owner and
to its competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by the
trade secret owner in developing the information; and (6) the ease or
difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others.262
Now, TUTSA defines a trade secret as “information that:
(A) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use; and (B) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under
the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 263
This specifically includes “a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, process, financial data, or list of actual or potential
customers or suppliers.” 264 Notably, TUTSA allows for information that has
potential economic value to be considered a trade secret. 265 Additionally, the
extent to which the information is known inside and outside of the trade secret
owner’s business is replaced with whether it is not generally known to people
who economically benefit from its disclosure. 266 Moreover, a trade secret owner’s
investment in developing the information is no longer a factor. 267 Finally,
confidentiality and privacy policies are now compared to what is “reasonable
under the circumstances.” 268
TUTSA controls the recovery of attorney’s fees. 269 Under TUTSA, the
prevailing party may be awarded attorney’s fees if a misappropriation claim is
made in bad faith, a party moves to terminate or resist an injunction in bad
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faith, or there is a finding of willful and malicious misappropriation. 270
Previously, a party was required to make a claim under the Texas Theft Liability
Act to recover attorney fees. 271
Under TUTSA, injunctive relief is still available, with an exception relating to
a material and prejudicial change of position due to the use of the trade secret
before “acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation.” 272 Under
these exceptional circumstances, the trade secret owner may obtain an
injunction that allows future use of the information upon payment of a
reasonable royalty. 273 Injunctive relief is now available for threatened
misappropriation. 274
In summary, TUTSA clarifies and expands the definition of a trade secret,
details when attorney’s fees may be provided, and allows for injunctive relief for
threatened misappropriation. With the enactment of TUTSA, companies may
now look to one body of law to determine their available legal remedies in
regards to trade secret misappropriation.
VI. CASES TO WATCH
The U.S. Supreme Court will again be quite active in the intellectual property
field in the upcoming year (i.e., 2014), having granted certiorari in nine IP
cases.275 In patents, the Court will determine whether computer-implemented
claims are patent-eligible subject matter in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank.276 Alice Corp
is especially important to maintaining the validity of thousands of business
method patents held by a large variety of industries. The Court will also review
the highly anticipated and controversial holding in Limelight Networks v. Akamai
Technologies, which allows for induced infringement of a patent without
underlying patent infringement liability. 277 The proper standard for evaluating
indefiniteness will also be considered in Nautilus v. Biosig Instruments. 278
Currently, courts give so much weight to the presumption of patent validity that
a claim may be considered definite even if “some experimentation may be
necessary to determine the scope of the claims” and the claim construction “may
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be formidable and the conclusion may be one over which reasonable persons
will disagree.” 279 It is possible that the Court will require a more rigorous
indefiniteness evaluation based on the statutory requirement that “claims
particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter.” 280 As
mentioned earlier, the Court has agreed to review two cases involving awarding
attorney’s fees in a patent case, which could help deter unreasonable patent
infringement claims. 281 In trademark, the Court will determine who has
standing under the Lanham Act, to challenge a food or beverage label as
misleading or false in POM Wonderful. 282 In a highly anticipated copyright case,
Aereo, Inc. will finally know whether its literal reading of the Copyright Act’s
“public performance” complies with the copyright law.283 The decision in ABC,
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. could affect all cable providers and the way in which cable is
streamed over the internet. 284
VII. CONCLUSION
The IP law developments during the Survey period reflect a wide variety of IP
issues and will have profound effects on multiples industries, as well as patent
litigants. For example, the Court’s decision in Bowman has created additional
certainty in the agricultural biotechnology industry, while the Court’s decision
in Myriad might affect future research activities relating to human genes.
Defendant-friendly developments were noted in the Federal Circuit, including
the ability to potentially avoid a damages trial in Robert Bosch, the development
of a good-faith belief in invalidity to avoid induced infringement liability in
Commil, and the award of Rule 11 sanctions for unreasonable claim
construction arguments in Raylon. Finally, new laws, such as The Patent Law
Treaties Implementation Act of 2012 and the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act
were enacted. In summary, the Survey period was interesting and varied, with a
large number of issues to be decided within the next year.
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